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 Deportations and Counterinsurgency 
A Comparison of Malaya, Algeria and Romania 
 
ANDREI MIROIU 
 
 
 
Like Molière’s bourgeois, who wrote prose without knowing it, the 
American armed forces fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan between the invasion of the 
respective countries in 2001-2003 and roughly 2006 practiced counterinsurgency 
(COIN) without knowing it or, more accurately, without admitting it1. Ever since 
the end of the Vietnam War, COIN had been perceived as having very little to do 
with the “American Way in Warfare”, which concerned mostly large-scale conflicts 
fought for vital objectives and mobilizing vast numbers of soldiers supported by 
tremendous material resources2. Very few officers had any formal theoretical or 
practical training in fighting armed rebels, and the political leadership in the 
Department of Defense had even forbidden the use of the word “insurgency” in the 
initial post-occupation stages in Iraq. The situation changed after 2005-2006, when 
the U.S. elite decided to put its trust in a particular group of military officers and 
academics who advocated the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN) as the best 
solution to the twin nightmares of Afghanistan and Iraq3. Led by General David 
Petraeus, the group rewrote the American tactical and strategic guidelines for 
conflicts in occupied countries and then, under his direct command, applied this 
strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan4. This particular school elevated the experiences of 
late colonial warfare, notably the French experience in Algeria and the British 
                                                        
1
  I would like to thank Dr Andrew Tan, Dr David Lee, Dr William Clapton and an 
anonymous reviewer of Studia Politica for their help in revising this article. Fragments of 
this article were presented at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Australian Historical 
Association in Wollongong, the World History Association Conference “Empire, Faith 
and Conflict” in Fremantle and the “Past, Present, Future: Shifting Boundaries”, UNSW 
Postgraduate Conference in Sydney. I am thankful to the other panelists and participants 
for their helpful comments and criticism. 
2
  Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War. A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy, Macmillan, New York, 1973. 
3
  Counterinsurgency stands for the ensemble of political and military measures a central 
government takes against armed rebel groups challenging its policies or rule. Andrew T.H. 
Tan, U.S. Strategy against Global Terrorism. How It Evolved, Why It Failed, and Where It 
is Headed, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009; Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn. America’s 
Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, The New Press, New York, 2013.  
4
  This process is carefully detailed in Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents. David Petraeus and 
the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2013. 
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campaign in Malaya to the status of policy guides for the early 21st century world5. 
This article attempts two things: to briefly recall the argument that in order 
to understand the contemporary COIN approach we must go back to its actual and 
professed intellectual and practical roots, the study of the classical 
counterinsurgencies fought immediately after the Second World War both by 
Western and Eastern states; and to highlight the centrality of internal deportations 
for military victory against the rebels by discussing this approach in Malaya, 
Algeria and Romania. This centrality makes it very hard for contemporary 
democratic states to pursue successful COIN, as doing so would place their 
governments in a moral breach with their own standards and values and in a 
tenuous position concerning internal and international law. 
The significance for the theory and practice of contemporary COIN of the 
campaigns fought after the Second World War needs hardly be demonstrated. 
Critically or not, all major COIN authors and practitioners ground their works and 
conclusions on the supposedly “golden era of COIN”6. David Kilcullen, one of the 
academic and military brains behind the anti-insurgent approach in Afghanistan and 
Iraq consciously posits his theory of a comprehensive approach to a globalized 
insurgency as both a continuation and sharp correction of the lessons learned from 
the theorists of the 1960`, especially British expert Robert Thompson7. To advance 
a relatively similar position another foremost analyst of the phenomenon, John 
Mackinlay frames his approach of the contemporary global insurgency as a post-
Maoist phase, thus basing his theory on the presumed importance of Mao Zedong’s 
influence on the classical, Cold War armed rebellions8. Probably more importantly 
from a practical perspective, the 2006 US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
co-authored by General David Petraeus, the top COIN officer in Iraq and then 
Afghanistan, contains historical sections with lessons learned from previous 
conflicts in Malaya, Algeria or Vietnam, as well as a quite significant bibliography 
of the works on which the entire approach is based9.  
                                                        
5
  Beatrice Heuser, “The Cultural Revolution in Counterinsurgency”, The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, 2007, pp. 153-171. 
6
  See for the term encompassing the period from 1948 to 1973 James D. Kiras, “Irregular 
Warfare”, in David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher 
Tuck, C. Dale Walton, Understanding Modern Warfare, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2008, p. 260. The two years obviously refer to the beginning of the Malayan 
Emergency and the end of American military involvement in the war in Vietnam. 
7
  The quintessence of his approach can be found in David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 166-167. 
8
 The larger argument is in John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago. From Mao to bin 
Laden, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009. 
9
  US Army, Counterinsurgency FM 3-24, December 2006. 
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Present-day theorists and practitioners see the classical counterinsurgencies of 
the early post-1945 period in a particular light. The “hearts and minds” approach, 
which forms the consensus in contemporary Western COIN and stands for a 
strategy that centres on winning the active and willing support of the civilian 
population in the struggle against armed rebels, is essentially the conventional 
wisdom about what happened in Malaya in the 1950’s10. Similarly, the widely held 
modern belief that the use of purely military means to destroy an armed rebellion is 
wrong is based on a set of analyses of the French experience in Algeria from 1954 
to 196211. Again, the conviction that there is very little use in studying non-Western 
strategies of COIN because of their alleged over-reliance on violence and lack of a 
politically-driven approach to quelling the rebellion also stems from the literature of 
the 1960’s. For instance, according to some authors, the Soviet Union’s “non-
Western” culture, history and geography is responsible for its approach to COIN 
being substantially different from those of the London, Paris or Washington12. 
This article will showcase that internal deportation, an approach that can 
hardly be conceived in the “hearts and minds” framework, was crucial in both 
Malaya and Algeria. Amongst the many civilian approaches and military tactics 
including propaganda, political promises, intelligence gathering, the formation of 
informant networks, direct strikes, ambushes, cordons, patrols and combined-arms 
operations, internal deportation stands as a preeminent tool for the authorities which 
despite its moral, legal, economic and social implications was chosen for its 
efficacy in quelling armed rebellion. This will highlight the hypocrisy of current 
military guidelines concerning COIN, such as the American FM 3-24 (2006) a 
document that failed to engage with the harrowing reality and magnitude of 
deportations despite being based to a large degree on the works of David Galula, a 
                                                        
10
  The classic on the subject is Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare. The 
Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989. For the 
consensus see Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy. Thinking War from Antiquity to 
the Present, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 436-437. For a strong, 
polemic attack on the current and historical theory and practice of COIN see Douglas 
Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013. 
11
  For a typical example of these analyses, usually written with very little or no use of 
French sources see John Pimlott, “The French Army: from Indochina to Chad, 1946-
1984”, in Ian F.W. Beckett, John Pimlott (eds.), Armed Forces and Modern Counter-
Insurgency, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pp. 47-66. 
12
  See for this and the persistence of this attitude Rod Paschall, “Soviet Counterinsurgency: 
Past, Present and Future” in Richard H. Shultz (ed.), Guerrilla Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency. U.S. – Soviet Policy in the Third World, Lexington Books, Lexington, 
1989. 
ANDREI MIROIU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 2  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
French theorist and an officer in Algeria13. Furthermore, by including the Romanian 
case, the article shows that there was positively little difference in how internal 
deportation was pursued by democratic and authoritarian governments, throwing 
doubt that cultural markers are important in understanding post-war repression of 
armed rebels.    
 
 
Malaya 
 
Between 1948 and 1960 the Malayan Peninsula was swept by a bitter 
struggle pitting the colonial power, the United Kingdom and its local allies against 
the political and military organizations of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). 
While to some extent this conflict was fought on ideological lines, the ethnic 
dimension should be mentioned at the beginning of the analysis, as the MCP was 
overwhelmingly recruited from amongst the large Chinese minority of Malaya. It 
thus allowed the British to gather the support of both the rich Chinese and majority 
Malays and to present their internal repression of a pro-independence movement in 
the light of the broader East-West Cold War, thus gaining support at home and in 
other Western nations14. 
From a military perspective Malaya featured a vast array of operations and 
approaches. Conventional manoeuvres by company-sized units against Communist 
“regiments” took place in the early stages of the conflict; for many years the Royal 
Air Force bombed the jungles; ambushes, patrols, sweeps through the jungle and 
the cordoning of big population centres were all attempted. A vast intelligence 
network operated against Communist supporters and informers in the big cities and 
the rural communities and was combined with a psychological warfare campaign 
that featured the distribution of leaflets, radio broadcasts, and low-flying aircraft 
with megaphones and re-education camps for captured rebels. British Special 
Forces hunted down the Communist insurgents deep into the jungle, forming local 
alliances with the Malayan aborigines dwelling in the forests. Most importantly, 
population control was exercised on an extremely large scale. Over half a million 
Chinese peasants were deported from the jungle fringes into Malayan-policed and 
                                                        
13
  Lalaeh Khalili, Time in the Shadows. Confinement in Counterinsurgencies, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2013, p. 183. 
14
  See Anthony Short, “The Malayan Emergency”, in Ronald Haycock (ed.), Regular Armies 
and Insurgency, Croom Helm, London, 1979, pp. 65-66; Charles Townshend, Britain’s 
Civil Wars. Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century, Faber and Faber, London, 1986; 
Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960, Macmillan, London, 1990. 
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administered secure villages surrounded by barbwire. Food was rationalized and 
controlled; identification cards were issued and were mandatory. Habeas corpus 
was suspended and judges were forced to issue death sentences for everyone caught 
carrying an illegal weapon; whole villages were sometimes arrested and collective 
fines were imposed. This goes a good measure against the “hearts-and-minds” 
approach, but somehow that particularly narrative still dominates the academic 
discourse concerning the Malayan Emergency15. 
The most notorious aspect of the population control policies in Malaya was 
the vast program of internal deportation, called in official documents and 
subsequent academic literature “resettlement”. The British colonial government 
realized soon after initial military operations failed to destroy the insurgents that 
one of its most important strategies needs to be the separation of the rebels from 
their sources of support. As the MCP was 90% Chinese and drew its strength from 
the poor elements of this ethnic group of the peninsula, the authorities resolved to 
target the group in order to destroy the Min Yuen (People’s Movement), the 
communist logistical and intelligence network operating inside the Chinese 
community16. 
Internal deportation was identified early on as the best way to deal with the 
rebel’s support network17. Indeed, programs of moving the rural ethnic Chinese in 
                                                        
15
  Good sources on the military aspects of the Malayan conflict are James E. Dougherty, 
“The Guerrilla War in Malaya”, in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla 
Warfare. Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961, The Free Press of 
Glencoe, New York, 1964, pp. 300-306; Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 
Faber and Faber, London, 1967; Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla 
Warfare…cit.; John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Praeger, Westport, Conn., 2002; David Ucko, 
“Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948-
1960”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72; Karl Hack, “The 
Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm”, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 32, 
no. 3, 2009, pp. 383-414.  
16
  While this was realised fairly early, the crystallization of the policy was in the proposals 
issued by Lieutenant-General Harold Briggs in the spring of 1950. The outline of his 
strategy called for: dominating the populated area, securing them and use them as 
information sources; breaking up the Min Yuen in the populated areas; therefore to isolate 
the bandits from the food and information supply organization; destroying the bandits by 
forcing them to attack the security forces in the secured territory, see “The Briggs Plan” 
CAB 21/1681 MAL C(50)23, Appendix, 24 May 1950 in A.J. Stockwell (ed.), A.J. 
Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part II, The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953, , HMSO, 
London, 1995, p. 217.  
17
  Telegram from Henry Gurney to Creech Jones CO717/167/52849/2/1948, ff. 108-110, 25 
October 1948 in A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part II, cit., pp. 77-79. 
ANDREI MIROIU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 2  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
government-controlled communities started in 1949 under the High Commissioner 
Sir Henry Gurney18, but were brought to their full intensity under High 
Commissioner and Director of Operations General Sir Gerald Templer, who ruled 
Malaya with proconsul powers from 1952 to 195419. It was during this latter period 
when the program was fully completed and the results became apparent. Overall, it 
involved the destruction of the squatters’ way of life, as all of them – half a million 
people – were forced to move from their villages (kampongs) in the jungle’s fringes 
to a number of “New Villages” in areas closer to the coast and to the main 
plantations and tin mines. In addition to that, another half a million Chinese already 
working on the plantations and tin mines were regrouped from their initial lodgings 
to government controlled and policed settlements20. 
The process of deportation itself was painful enough. Government troops 
usually arrived in a village and gave its inhabitants a few hours to gather their 
belongings after which they were herded in trucks and moved to their new places of 
residence. The troops then burned the village and destroyed the crops. To assuage 
their feelings, their superiors insured European soldiers and officers that the 
squatters were just nomads and the kampongs just temporary shelters21. Obviously, 
the Chinese peasants were not able to collect all of their belongings and they were 
seldom compensated for their losses22. 
The reality of “New Villages” has been portrayed by their proponents as 
clean, organized and safe communities offering their inhabitants security from 
attacks, good roads, schools and medical assistance23. Obviously this is true in a 
                                                        
18
  Cabinet memorandum by Creech Jones CAB 129/33/1, CP (49) 52, 5 March 1949 in A.J. 
Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part II, cit., p. 118. 
19
  However, by the time Templer became supremo in Malaya, these measures had already 
affected MCP strategy to a very large degree, Karl Hack, “Everyone Lived in Fear: 
Malaya and the British Way of Counter-insurgency”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 23, 
no. 4-5, 2012, pp. 671-699. 
20
  Numbers of the deported reached 423.000 for the Chinese squatters relocated in 410 new 
villages and – 116 about 650.000 mine and estate workers settled in wired-in villages. 
They accounted for about half of the entire Chinese community in Malaya, David French, 
Army, Empire, and Cold War. The British Army and Military Policy, 1945-1971, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 115. 
21
  Ibidem. 
22
  As one of the classic analysts of the Emergency said: “Putting the squatter inside a fence, 
and quickly, was all that seemed to matter”, Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in 
Guerrilla Warfare…cit., p. 103. 
23
  Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, Experiences from Malaya and 
Vietnam, Chatto & Windus, London, 1966, p. 121; James E. Dougherty, “The Guerrilla 
War in Malaya”, cit., p. 303. As late as 2010 some could write: “The Chinese villages 
were not constructed as concentration or labour camps, but as politically engaged and 
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certain technical regard, though in the initial phases of the resettlement program 
those who lived in the new communities found very little in terms of hygiene and 
education, at least until the government got organized and financed this program 
accordingly. The Chinese families were indeed allotted a small plot to build a hut 
and grow some crops and a sum to support them for their first five months24. They 
were also promised titles of property to the lands they were going to cultivate25. But 
from the perspective of the former squatters the reality of their new homes must 
have been strikingly different. Undergoing the trauma of having been moved from 
their homes, they found themselves in new, unknown surroundings, confined in 
what were effectively camps surrounded by barbwire, some with night perimeter 
lighting. Obviously, night moves were prohibited. Moreover, the villages were for 
many years guarded by police units raised almost entirely from the ethnic Malays, 
who were not necessarily displaying a very endearing attitude towards the 
Chinese26. It took a long time until the effect of government propaganda was 
positive and the authorities were able to replace the Malay policemen with Chinese 
Home Guards insuring the security of the New Villages27. 
Understanding that a main priority for destroying Min Yuen was the 
classification of all possible supporters, the government started issuing 
identification cards to all of the inhabitants of the new settlements, thus tracking 
their moves and connections. The identity cards comprised personal details, a 
photograph and fingerprint. By identity controls when leaving or entering the 
village and random controls on the roads, any suspect individual or move could be 
thus detected and brought to the attention of intelligence agencies28. The MCP 
understood this soon enough and it strove to destroy the identification cards of 
anyone they encountered, thus mostly insuring that the civilians went through a 
harrowing bureaucratic process of having to renew their cards.  
Possibly the most efficient COIN policy which was permitted by the 
resettlement program was strict food control and rationing. The Malayan soil cannot 
                                                                                                                                       
progressive communities”, David H. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency: The Legacy and 
Relevance of a Counter‐Insurgency Success Story”, Defence Studies, vol. 10, no. 1-2, 
2010, p. 26. 
24
  Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, cit., p. 59. 
25
  Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960, cit., p. 116. 
26
  Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists, Faber and Faber, London, 1977, p. 39; 
Idem, The Long Long War. Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, Frederick A. 
Praeger, New York, 1966, p. 40. 
27
  John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency, From Palestine to Northern Ireland, 
Palgrave, Houndmills, 2002, p. 41. 
28
  Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War…cit., p. 38.  
ANDREI MIROIU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 2  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
easily support vast numbers of people and the jungle itself, where guerrillas were 
forced to operate soon after the beginning of the crisis, is even less able to provide 
food to large numbers of people dwelling in it, especially if they are not accustomed 
to a hunters-gatherers lifestyle. By destroying the squatter settlements the British 
cut the lifeline those could give to the communist guerrillas29. To insure that food 
would not even trickle from the New Villages, strict food controls were 
implemented at the entrance of the settlements. The Chinese workers, who were 
marched daily to their new working places, be they rubber plantations, tin mines or 
agricultural plots, were subjected to systematic searches and controls for food. 
Workers were prevented for having any food for lunch; when food was issued to the 
inhabitants of the villages, it usually consisted of fried rice – which in the humid 
climate became uneatable within two days30.  
One should add that it was not only the Chinese who were subjected to the 
resettlement policies. In the early phases of the conflict, until it was realized that 
they can be turned to the government`s side with better effect if left in the jungles, 
substantial numbers of Malayan aborigines were also moved to New Villages. 
Unaccustomed to a sedentary lifestyle and confinement to enclosed, insalubrious 
places, the death toll among them was larger than in the ranks of the squatters31. 
Resettlement was not, obviously, an easy walk in the park for the military 
authorities. There were serious instances when the former squatters refused to 
comply with the government guidance in the new communities, either by 
continuing their support to the insurgents, either by refusing to cooperate with the 
police and intelligence agencies in providing information about the rebels. In some 
cases, the reaction of the authorities involved collective punishments over whole 
villages. General Gerald Templer, who otherwise coined the benign “hearts and 
minds” slogan for his policies, personally carried out such punishments in Tanjong 
Malim and other recalcitrant communities32. Put under arrest and an early curfew, 
the inhabitants and their elders were publicly scolded, fined and had their food 
rations reduced33. More often than not, collective punishments eventually produced 
                                                        
29
  Peter Lowe, Contending with Nationalism and Communism. British Policy towards 
Southeast Asia, 1945-65, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2009, p. 46. 
30
  The extremely detailed regulations concerning the conduct of searches can be found in 
Director of Operations, Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 3rd 
edition, 1958.  
31
  John D. Leary, Violence and the Dream People. The Orang Asli in the Malayan 
Emergency 1948-1960, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, 1995. 
32
  Charles Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars…cit., p. 160.  
33
  On collective punishment in Tanjong Malim, Pekan Jabi and Permatang Tinggi see the 
letter from Oliver Lyttleton to Grimond CO1022/56 no 35, 10 December 1952 in A.J. 
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compliance, although there were voices that doubted their efficiency34. In a few 
cases the reaction could be far more brutal. The most notorious incident was at the 
New Village of Batang Kali, where troops of the 2nd Scots Guards shot and killed 
under the pretence of an attempted escape 20 unarmed but recalcitrant Chinese 
villagers, with the whole incident deemed legal by the Attorney General of 
Malaya35. 
 
 
Algeria 
 
The war in Algeria (1954-1962) ended with the military victory of the 
French colonial power but its nearly complete defeat at the negotiations table36. 
Despite that, Algeria remains a very interesting example of colonial warfare, whose 
roots go all the way back to the war of conquest and particularly to the 1840s, when 
General than Marshal Thomas Bugeaud pioneered a series of counter-
insurrectionary tactics relevant to this day. For a century after Bugeaud, the officers 
who were responsible for the conquest of West Africa cut their teeth in Algeria, as 
did many of the important general who led armies in the major wars of the 20th 
century37. Socially, the main impact of the French was the introduction of the 
European system of private property and the vast transfer of lands to the colonists. 
The colonists came mainly from the impoverished regions in south-central France, 
but there were many Spaniards, Italians, Corsicans and Maltese as well38. 
The movement that came to embody the reaction of the Arab Algerians was 
a lay movement, who incorporated and subordinated the Islamic nationalists and the 
local Communists, to the surprise and dismay of some Frenchmen who wished to 
see everything through the prism of the West-East confrontation. The Algerian 
                                                                                                                                       
Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part II, cit., pp. 424-425. 
34
  For instance, Victor Purcell, Malaysia, Thames and Hudson, London, 1965, pp. 112-113.  
35
  David French, Army, Empire, and Cold War…cit., p. 123; Gregory Blaxland, The 
Regiments Depart. A History of the British Army, 1945-1970, William Kimber, London, 
1971, p. 87 gives 26 dead. 
36
  James S. Corum, Bad Strategies. How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency, Zenith 
Press, Minneapolis, 2008, pp. 77-78. 
37
  A.S. Kanya-Forstner, “The French Marines and the Conquest of the Western Sudan, 1880-
1899”, in J.A. De Moor, H.L Wesseling (eds.), Imperialism and War. Essays on Colonial 
Wars in Asia and Africa, Brill, Leiden, 1989, p. 120; Glenn E. Torrey, Henri Mathias 
Berthelot: General of France, Founder of Modern Romania, Center for Romanian 
Studies, Iași, 2000.  
38
  Eric R. Wolf, Peasants Wars of the Twentieth Century, Faber and Faber, London, 1971. 
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Front for National Liberation (FLN), boasting amongst its numbers former soldiers 
in the French army with counter-guerrilla experience in Indochina launched a 
campaign of bombings and assassinations on 1 November 1954. Soon, the action 
was concentrated in the agricultural hinterland of Algeria’s main cities, where the 
insurgents killed some European settlers and a far higher number of Arab loyalists. 
The rebels obtained weapons and other type of support from the Nationalist leader 
of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The authorities reacted swiftly enough, aided by the 
fact that unlike in Indochina, here they could use conscripted soldiers, as Algeria 
was part of metropolitan France. Paris amassed within a year and a half over 
190.000 troops against an estimated 20.000 rebels and through a system of raids, 
local terror, cordoning, clear-and-hold approaches effectively broke the back of the 
rural insurgency by 1956.  
When the FLN moved the fight to the streets of the big cities (Oran, 
Algiers, Constantine) through a ferocious bombing campaign against European 
civilians, the French authorities reacted by sending in crack troops, establishing a 
thorough intelligence system penetrating the rebels’ organizational and support 
network. Widespread torture was a mainstay of the system and along with the 
condoning of a vast anti-Arab campaign waged by local militias run by the 
European settlers was one of the causes for the eventual breakdown of political and 
social support for the Algerian campaign. But within months the urban insurgency 
was defeated, forcing the insurgents to move to the countryside and from there to 
the mountains. Continually harassed by raids of French Special Forces making good 
use of helicopters and increased firepower and isolated from possible help or 
sanctuaries in Morocco and Tunisia through a system of patrolled and electrified 
land barriers, the FLN was no serious military threat to the government. An 
economic program to develop the country made huge progress in the final years of 
the conflict. Rather than the actions of the rebels, the collapse of metropolitan 
French will to hold on to Algeria was the prime factor of the eventual proclamation 
of independence in 196239. 
While this is the traditional narrative concerning the Algerian War, 
population control approaches are central for understanding the outcome of the 
conflict. As in many previous and contemporary civil wars, the government 
                                                        
39
  The fragment on the course of the Algerian War is based on François Sully, The Age of the 
Guerrilla. The New Warfare, Parent’s Magazine Press, New York, 1968; Robert Faber, 
The War of the Flea, Paladin, Bungay, 1970; John Pimlott, “The French Army: from 
Indochina to Chad, 1946-1984”, cit.; Andre Nouschi, L’Algérie amère 1914-1994, 
Editions de la maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris, 1995; David Jordan, “Countering 
Insurgency from the Air: The Postwar Lessons”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 28, 
no.1, April 2007, pp. 96-111.  
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concluded that it would be beneficial to remove a large part of the Algerian Muslim 
population from small, distant villages where they could easily fall under the 
influence of the FLN into larger localities, closer to strategic points and army bases. 
It is estimated that a total of two and a half of the seven million Algerian Muslims 
that lived in the country in the late 1950s went through internal deportations, 
sometimes forcefully removed by French troops, who destroyed their homes and 
their cultivated lands40. 
The first camps were organized in the Aurès, a mountainous region in the 
East of the country as early as 1955, but their existence only became known to the 
wider public through the report of Michel Rocard, leaked to the press in March 
195941. 40.000 people were displaced in 1955. By summer 1957 there were already 
a million people in the camps. The Sections Administratives Spécialisées, the 
military-political units tasked with gaining the trust of the population and presented 
as the spearhead of a “hearts and minds” approach were also heavily involved in the 
whole process. By early 1959 there were over 936 centres in operation42. 
Altogether, the number of those deported or detained in their own villages 
amounted to a staggering 40% of the Algerian population. The most exact available 
figure for the number of those deported can be given for 1 April 1961, when 2.932 
centres held 1.958.302 people43. 
The strategy was widely welcomed by the officers of the “revolutionary 
warfare school”, who saw in it a possibility of applying their theory about cutting 
the link between the guerrillas and the population. Although some of the camps 
were presented by propaganda as model villages, many were surrounded by 
barbwire, were heavily guarded and movement was supervised44. Among the 2.5 
million Algerians placed in the camps the most affected were the 400.000 nomads, 
whose way of life was completely altered. They were specifically targeted in order 
to cut the guerrillas from a source of food and information. To force them in the 
camps, sometimes their herds were machine-gunned from French military aircraft45. 
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At most, the deported had a few days or hours to pick up their goods and 
leave. Most frequently, however, army trucks would simply arrive at a village, 
surround it and immediately transport everyone to their new lodgings46. Even more 
strikingly, the soldiers compelled the Algerian Muslims to sign documents in 
French saying that they voluntarily agree to the destruction of their own homes as a 
contribution to the war and that they would seek no material compensation47. The 
new settlements, sometimes simple ghettos in already existing large urban 
concentrations, were controlled through the use of military troops, but more useful 
than these were the networks of agents of influence and informers that French 
intelligence established in their midst48. The camps were devised to crush all idea of 
private life and in fact they were a tool of total control over the bodies and minds of 
the interned49. This process of internal deportation, like similar events in history, led 
to much untold suffering, both through the loss of the old way of life and former 
homes and through the often insalubrious new surroundings, devoid of proper 
sanitation and public services50. Disease and depression took countless lives and the 
material and psychological damage could never be fully estimated. In addition to 
internal deportation, French officers also introduced numbers for the houses and 
cards for each dwelling containing the number and description of the inhabitants 
and other information in order to improve population control51. 
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Romania 
 
An armed movement against the pro-Moscow authorities in the Romanian 
capital of Bucharest began virtually as soon as the country switched sides on 23 
august 1944, moving from an alliance with Nazi Germany to one with the Soviet 
Union and its allies. The government fought them for over a decade and a half, until 
the last armed opponents surrendered, were killed or captured in the early 1960s. 
While this was a very low-intensity conflict and the insurgent groups were never 
truly able to challenge the pro-Soviet power structures, we can talk in the Romanian 
case of an insurgency in the sense of a politically motivated, armed struggle against 
a central government. Indeed, when compared with the Malayan and Algerian case, 
the Romanian insurgency can be even more relevant for contemporary concerns, 
being a scattered, diffuse and leaderless movement united nevertheless by an 
ideology (nationalism) and by the belief that armed struggle would contribute to the 
downfall of an illegitimate regime supported by a foreign power. We cannot talk of 
any specific political program that was shared by the insurgents as there was none 
(unlike the pro-independence political manifestoes of the MCP and the FLN), but 
the documents consulted as well as secondary literature points out to the 
nationalism of the insurgents as well as their universal desire to see an end of the 
regime of the Romanian communists. In this it resembles what Mark Sageman 
called the “leaderless jihad” to describe the early 2000s evolutions in the Middle 
East52. 
In the growing literature of armed anti-communist resistance in Romania a 
relative consensus has emerged in what regards the outlook and ultimate fate of the 
guerrillas. According to most authors, they were mostly small groups of up to 20 
armed individuals, generally living in remote rural areas, preferably with 
mountainous terrain. They relied to a great measure on the networks of family and 
friends in these villages, providing them with shelter, food, information, physical 
and moral comfort53. They were formed mostly of local anti-communist peasants, 
led by charismatic figures recruited from former notabilities, notaries, teachers and 
army officers. A good number of them were city-folk who took to the mountains to 
add their efforts to the armed resistance and one could find among them students, 
lawyers and traders. Politically, many had not been affiliated before or during the 
war, while others had been liberals, members of the National Peasants Party, social 
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democrats, and even some were former communists54. Many of them, though not 
the majority, were legionaries, sympathisers of the Romanian fascist movement55. 
Armed with light weapons, mostly pistols, rifles, grenades and occasionally 
automatic weapons, the guerrillas may have had a modicum of military training due 
to many of them serving in the army during the Second World War. Most of their 
attacks were attempts at sabotage, strikes against local communists and local party 
buildings or confrontations with the armed forces of the regime56. Ultimately, their 
fate was sealed by a combination of intelligence work from the authorities, 
involving the creation of an informative network in the area, the use of torture and 
intimidation, infiltrators, “counter-gangs” with surgical operations when the groups’ 
location was discovered57. Disillusionment and discouragement coupled with 
betrayal also accounted to the capture of some of the rebels, some going down 
fighting, some taking their own lives while many others ending before a firing 
squad or spending long years in labour camps and prisons58. 
The lessons learned in the early years of fighting the guerrillas, 1945-1948 
led the Romanian communists to the belief that preventive action was needed 
whenever a certain segment of the population might be inclined to revolt or support 
partisan activity. Mass internal deportation was to play a prominent part from now 
on in dealing with dangerous communities.  
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The most prominent of these took place in the early summer of 1951 when 
40.000 people were deported in the course of one day from Banat, a region in 
western Romania bordering Yugoslavia to the Bărăgan, a barren region in the east 
of the country, close to the Danube. Some of the deportees had been forcibly moved 
a number of times before: Romanians from Bessarabia were moved to Banat than 
deported to Bărăgan. Aromanians from Greece moved to Southern Dobrogea in the 
20s, to the Banat in 1940 and to the Bărăgan in the 1950s59. The main reason for 
this action was the suspicion that the local communities would collude with Tito’s 
regime in the case of conflict between Yugoslavia and the rest of the Soviet camp.  
Deportations were done according to Decision 200/1951 of the Romanian 
government which called for the forcible movement of the population living in a 25 
km belt close to the Yugoslav border. About 970 of the ethnic local Serbs had been 
partisans in Tito’s armies during the war and had maintained close relations with 
their former comrades leaving in the neighbour country60. The deportation plan was 
finalized by the Securitate on 14 November 1950 and identified 40,320 people as 
“security risks”. They comprised 1.330 foreign citizens, 8.477 Romanian refugees 
from Soviet-occupied Bessarabia, 3.557 Macedonians, 2.344 people who 
collaborated with the German army in World War II, 257 Germans, 1.054 
“supporters of Tito”, 1.218 people with relatives abroad, 367 who had supported 
anti-communist guerrillas, 731 “enemies of the socialist regime”, 19.034 rich 
peasants and innkeepers, 162 former big landlords and bourgeois and 341 convicted 
criminals. However, a different research suggests that 9.413 of the deportees were 
ethnic Germans. Of them, 629 died in the Bărăgan.  
Over 10.000 Army and Militia troops took part in the deportations and in 
addition to the trains 6.211 trucks were also used. As even this huge mobilization 
was insufficient, some families waited under the open sky for two or three days to 
be deported and most of them, upon arrival, were just abandoned on an open field61. 
All deportations were organized by the local party committees and were conducted 
by officers of the Militia, who arrived at their target’s homes at 1 AM62. The goods 
of the deported were immediately seized by inventory commissions, who paid for 
them in cash63. Some of the deported found out about the imminence of their 
dislocation and had their luggage prepared. One person, upon being notified of his 
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impending deportation, committed suicide. During the searches, weapons and 
ammunition were found at some of the richer peasants, but there were no arrests for 
partisan activity were made64. 
Each train used in the deportation was huge, with 60-62 carriages, largely 
because each carriage was carrying only one family and their goods. They were 
allowed to take food, furniture, horses, a cow, their own horse-drawn cart and a 
pig65. In total, 66 trains with 2.622 carriages transported on 18 June 3.537 families, 
while another 3.276 families were still awaiting embarkation66. Upon arrival in the 
barren plains of the Bărăgan, the deported were to be employed as farm-hands at 
state-owned farms. In order to emphasize that the move was permanent, the 
authorities forced them to create new communities and to build new houses. By 
necessity, these houses were initially just hovels, which quickly became unsuited 
for living in the local climate, characterized by very little water in dry season but 
extreme humidity once rains began67. 
The Securitate admitted in its internal documents that the action of the 
local party leadership as the deportees reached the Bărăgan was extremely 
disorganized and unable to cope with the necessities of those relocated. The 
deportees had to pay for their food and the construction materiel for their new 
homes. Therefore, a big difference was noted between the poor and the rich among 
them, the latter having the resources to pay for what they needed68. Building a 
house was compulsory; those who refused or were slow in doing so were prevented 
from getting jobs at local farms, seriously hurting the possibility of feeding their 
families. In a sign that the action was disorganized, some of the deported were 
allowed to build their new houses wherever they pleased, as the area was extremely 
large and sparsely populated. In the new localities, those arrived from Banat had the 
opportunity to meet others who were enduring the same fate; some of the engineers 
responsible for the building of the villages were also deported from other cities69. 
Others were families of the partisans, who had been deported from their regions to 
put psychological pressure on the guerrillas and to remove one of their sources of 
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support70. 
Many perished in the harsh winters of the Bărăgan because of hunger, cold, 
desperation and low-quality medical care. The villages built by the deportees – and 
left by most of them after the amnesty of 1956 were demolished by the authorities 
in 1964, in an effort to efface the memory of a period of repression71. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has charted deportations during post-war counterinsurgencies in 
Malaya, Algeria and Romania. To a large degree, the findings point out that in each 
of these cases the governmental authorities perceived that internal dislocation of 
populations through massive forced resettlement were key aspects in fighting a 
successful COIN. In Malaya and Algeria the figures for those deported were 
staggering, reaching between 15 and 40% of the entire population of the two 
colonies. Whereas in Malaya the British and their ethnic Malay allies targeted 
specifically the Chinese minority, especially the poor, rural elements, as well as some of 
the Aborigines, in Algeria the French authorities targeted indiscriminately the 
Muslim population which was in any way liable of escaping strict government 
control. In Romania deportations either targeted specific regions that were deemed 
untrustworthy and possibly rebellious, or were specifically directed at the families 
of the armed rebels in order to punish them and force them to surrender. In all cases 
dislocations were brutal, with the families deported being given hours or at most 
days to gather a few belongings before being marched or transported to the 
resettlement areas. In Malaya and Algeria the villages were destroyed by 
governmental troops and little of no compensation was payed to those deported. In 
Romania the government confiscated houses and property and paid a meagre sum to 
the deported, but generally allowed them to take more property with them. 
The reality of the new settlements varied between forced labour 
concentration camps in Malaya to closely supervised and guarded villages in 
Algeria to fairly scattered, isolated makeshift settlements in the middle of a large 
and inhospitable plain in Romania. The deported faced in most cases terrible 
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conditions in the initial stages, with food shortages (or food controls in Malaya), 
almost no building materials, privacy-erasing conditions and extremely poor conditions. 
Forced resettlement meant in all cases the destruction, sometimes complete and 
definitive of the previous way of life, with incalculable psychological and economic 
consequences. This led to a vast number, perhaps never to be fully known, of people 
dead of hunger, disease, deprivations or depression. Interrogations sometimes 
including torture, control movement, creation of spy networks in the new 
settlements, the obligation to be identified, catalogued and to produce identification 
papers were also forced on the deported. In the most extreme cases, some of the 
deported were summarily executed when they disobeyed the authorities or were 
suspected of helping the rebels. 
This discussion has highlighted the fact that there were precious few 
differences between the approaches concerning deportations of the professed 
democracies of Western Europe and a “proletarian dictatorship” modelled after the 
Stalinist Soviet Union. Even more poignantly, most of these differences were not in 
the favour of Britain or France. The deportations amounted in all three cases to a 
war fought by the government against its citizens, the very source of its authority. 
These particular lessons were, thankfully, ignored by the practitioners of COIN in 
the wars fought by US-led coalitions in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Iraq (2003-
2011), as they were technically impossible with the limited military means 
available, in addition to being morally reprehensible and illegal. However, 
incomplete accounts of campaigns in Malaya and Algeria, failing to account for the 
role of brutality and specifically of internal deportations in those conflicts, still 
dominate contemporary COIN discussions and military manuals. Current 
policymakers should be aware of the centrality of population control in winning 
post-war counterinsurgencies and weigh the merits of pursuing such a strategy. 
 
